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As an inevitable fact of life, death is a mysterious specter looming
over us as we move through the world. It consumes our literature,
religions, and social dialogues-the death of a prominentfigure can
change policies and perceptions about our approaches to many
problems. Given death's significance, it is reasonable to try to
understand causes of death generally, as well as on a case-by-case
basis. While scholars and mourners attempt to answer the
philosophical questions about death, the practical and technical
questions are typically answered by death investigators. Death
investigators attempt to decipher the circumstances surrounding
suspicious and unexplained deaths to provide solace to family
members and information to law enforcement services to help them
determine whether further investigative steps are necessary. But while
the answers provided by death investigators may provide some
direction, in many ways the death investigation system actually
inhibits the pursuitofjustice.
The current death investigation system creates conflicts of interest
between death investigators andprosecutors. Death investigators and
prosecutors are often organized under the same governmental
structure or even within the same offices. This close association
between the two systems results in patterns of relationships that
disadvantage defense teams and prevent equal access to death
investigation resources. This Article explores the ways in which the
death investigation system is constrainedby prosecutorialdiscretion
and the institutional proximity of the two offices. This Article also
examines how this relationship constitutes a failure of the justice
system in the form of both overt and discreet conflicts of interest
between death investigators and prosecutors. The effects of these
conflicts can be remedied, however. The Article thus provides
recommendations to enhance the accuracy and integrity of the death
investigationprocess.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the 2016 presidential campaign, an unexpected
occurrence changed the landscape of American jurisprudence: Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead in his sleep.' Justice Scalia died at a
West Texas ranch while on a hunting trip with friends. 2 His death sparked a
political battle for control over the Supreme Court, with the United States
Senate refusing to conduct hearings on a replacement justice with eleven
I See Amy Brittain & Sari Horwitz, Texas Sheriffs Report Reveals More Details on
Supreme Court Justice Scalia's Death, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/world/national-security/texas-sheriff-releases-report-on-supreme-court-justice
-scalias-death/2016/02/23/8cObdb0c-da82-11le5-891a4ed04f4213e8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/VN3K-N34P]
(reporting that Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016).
2
See id
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months left in President Obama's last term. 3 While many people knew the
political ramifications of Justice Scalia's death, few people focused on the
procedural problems related to how his death was handled. 4
Justice Scalia was discovered in bed with a pillow over his head. His
breathing apparatus had been switched off, and his head was elevated on three
pillows.5 Despite the curious scene, the justice of the peace declared Scalia
dead from natural causes; he issued this finding by telephone without having
any official examine the body, let alone perform an autopsy. 6 While this
process led to numerous conspiracy theories and paranoia, the investigation
surrounding Justice Scalia's death sheds light on the sorry state of death
investigations in the United States. There is no federal framework governing
death investigations or the qualifications of death investigators. Thus, local
officials in small counties are left with the power to make sometimes
momentous decisions that have far-reaching impact. Because Justice Scalia
died in Texas, state law governed, giving a small town judge and a justice of
the peace sole power to determine the cause of Justice Scalia's death without
an autopsy.7
As in Justice Scalia's case, death investigators are generally charged with
classifying suspicious, unexplained, or mysterious deaths. The death
3

See Nina Totenberg, 170-Plus Days and Counting: GOP Unlikely to End Supreme
CourtBlockade Soon, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/06/492857860/17
3-days-and-counting-gop-unlikely-to-end-blockade-on-garland-nomination-soon
[https://perma.cc/GQP6-XP77] (explaining that Senate Republicans refused to hold
hearings, take votes, or take any action at all to confirm President Obama's Supreme Court
nominee, Merrick Garland, to fill Justice Scalia's vacant Supreme Court seat). After the
election of Donald Trump to the presidency, he rescinded the Garland nomination, and then
nominated Neil Gorsuch to fill Justice Scalia's seat; the Senate later confirmed Gorsuch.
See Ariane de Vogue & Dan Berman, Neil Gorsuch Confirmedto the Supreme Court, CNN
(Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/politics/neil-gorsuch-senate-vote/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/MLG6-LR9N].
4
See generally Nora Kelly, Why Wasn't Antonin Scalia Given an Autopsy?, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antoninscalia-autopsy/463251/ [https://perma.cc/PG8U-AQKV] (stating that, while one might
assume that a federal investigation would take place, in actuality the local government in a
small Texas town handled Justice Scalia's death).
5See Antonin Scalia Suffered from Many Health Problems, Doctor Says, CBS NEWS

(Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/antonin-scalia-suffered-from-manyhealth-problems-doctor-says [https://perma.cc/N6GG-9GCU].
6
See Kelly, supra note 4 (noting that local justices of the peace were initially called
to examine Justice Scalia's death, but they were not available; a county judge pronounced
Scalia dead of natural causes over the phone); see also Mark Berman, Texas Judge Defends
Decision Not to Order Autopsy for Justice Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/16/texas-judge-defendsdecision-not-to-order-autopsy-for-justice-scalia [https://perma.cc/78E8-4LGP] (reporting
that the county judge who pronounced Justice Scalia dead of natural causes without an
autopsy did so out of respect for Justice Scalia's family's wishes).
7 See Kelly, supra note 4 (noting that, under Texas law, an over-the-phone death
investigation is legal).
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investigator examines the deceased, investigates the scene, and makes a
determination concerning the extent to which further investigation is needed.8
Despite these lofty responsibilities, each state sets its own standards on what
type of death investigation system to utilize and what qualifications are
necessary for becoming a death investigator.9 Regardless of the system
selected, death investigators are intended to serve as an independent body that
answers important personal and social questions about the cause and nature of
deaths.' 0 To meet these goals, they provide evidence to prosecution and
defense teams in criminal and civil cases. 1
The actuality, however, has fallen far short of the ideal. While death
investigators may generally be successful at classifying deaths, limited
resources, bureaucratic realities, and the types of work they do have placed
them in close proximity with prosecutors, ultimately jeopardizing their
objectivity and their independence. 12 The system is structured in a way that
places defense teams at a disadvantage and creates a situation that is ripe for
conflicts of interest between death investigators and prosecutors.1 3 Some of
these conflicts might result from outright collusion, while others may present
themselves in subtle ways.1 4 Even the most well-intentioned death
investigators might find themselves in situations in which they are influenced
by the pressures of the system.15
This Article explores the relationship between death investigators and
prosecutors, and how the structure of the system leads to conflicts of interest
between them. Part I explores the essential actors who operate in the death
investigation system and how the system is constrained by prosecutorial
discretion and official immunity. Part II examines how conflicts of interest
manifest between death investigators and prosecutors, specifically due to both
8

FAQ, AM. BD. MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATORS, http://www.abmdi.org/faq

[https://perma.cc/VWR7-WBD7].
9

See Things to Know-No National Standards, Little Oversight, PBS (Feb. 1, 2011),
[hereinafter
Things
to
Know]
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/postmortem/things-to-know/no-standards.html [https://perma.cc/WLW2-MX22]
(explaining
that there is no federal oversight of death investigations and very few offices are
accredited, resulting in variations among states).
t0
See INST. OF MED., BD. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION,
MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 7, 32-33 (2003)
[hereinafter MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM] ("To ensure the quality and

integrity of death investigations, medical . . . professionals should form institutions that are
truly independent.").
1 See id at 7.
12
See id at 10-11, 33 (discussing the challenges facing the death investigation field
and the proximity of prosecutors to death investigators).
13 See id at 31 (stating that the defense has the right to participate in the medical
investigation, but it is nearly impossible because the defendant can rarely find a death
investigator in the twenty-four-hour limit).
14
See id at 31-32.
15
See id (highlighting instructions from prosecutors to medical examiners to testify
in a way that does not allow cross-examination from a defense attorney).
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inappropriate influence and the proximity of the death investigator and
prosecutor offices. Part 111 highlights the most crucial recommendations for
strengthening and reforming the death investigation system: establishing a
federal agency to implement uniform death investigation standards; abolishing
the coroner system in favor of a medical examiner system; and requiring
advanced medical training and education for future death investigators. The
Article concludes that implementing these recommendations will help correct
the focus of the death investigation system towards a more balanced and
independent organization.
II. BACKGROUND
When a person dies of unexplained or suspicious causes, the American
death investigation system begins to examine the circumstances surrounding
the death. 16 Generally, the system is composed of medical and forensic experts
who investigate the scene of death and examine the corpse via an autopsy. 17
Death investigators provide critical forensic evidence and testimony, which
helps parties-such as the prosecution--develop a theory explaining the cause
of death.1 8 In circumstances in which foul play is suspected, investigators
provide evidence and reports to the prosecutor. 19 The prosecutor is endowed
with great discretionary powers that shape how investigations proceed. 20
While potentially constrained by some standards that protect defendants, the
prosecutor influences the death investigation system by dictating the ways in
which results may be used, potentially influencing the actions of the
investigators. 2 1 This Part explores the history and structure of the death
investigation system and explains how prosecutorial discretion, evidentiary
standards, and immunity constrain death investigators.
A. Death Investigators
Death investigations classify the circumstances surrounding a suspicious
or unexplained death. 22 Death investigators inspect crime scenes, perform
16

MEDICOLEGAL

DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note

10, at 7.

I7 See id. at 7-8.
18
See id at 31-32.
19

See id. at 31. The death investigator goes to the scene of the death, examines the
body and the surrounding area, takes photographs of the scene, transports the body to their
office, and generally usually performs an autopsy. Id The evidence collected through this
process is passed on to the prosecutor. Id
20

See id
21 See infra Parts 1I.B.2-3.
22

Suspicious or unexplained deaths that require a death investigation typically
include "homicides, suicides, unintentional injuries, drug-related deaths, and other deaths
that are sudden or unexpected. Approximately 20% of the 2.4 million deaths in the US
each year are investigated by medical examiners and coroners . . . ." MEDICOLEGAL DEATH
INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 7.
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autopsies, and classify deaths resulting from crimes, health, safety or
environmental hazards, and inadequate medical care. 23 There is no centralized
federal investigation system. 24 States thus have flexibility to choose among a
coroner system, a medical examiner system, or a hybrid system. While states
choose which system will work best based on their needs and available
resources, the lack of a uniform system has led to many inconsistencies across
the country. 2 5 This Section considers how the death investigation system
changed over time and how these systems continue to operate today.
1. History and Advances
The earliest death investigations were conducted by coroners who, during
twelfth century England, determined whether property of the deceased would
go to the king. 26 Coroners, or "crowners," as they were originally known,
protected the king's proprietary interest against various individuals and groups
who attempted to take possession of real and personal property that became
available after suspicious deaths. 27 It was not until 1887 that coroners shifted
their focus from protecting the king's interests to making medical
determinations regarding the cause of death. 28 Additionally, coroners were
appointed based on political favoritism, thus leading to a potentially corrupt
system. 29
The coroner system came to America with the earliest settlers, as signified
by the first inquest in 1635.30 At first, the American system mirrored the
English system in that coroners were appointed; over time, however, America
began to elect coroners. 3 1 The move from appointments to elections was aimed
at reducing corruption within the coroner system and preventing coroners from

23

See id. Modem-day

death investigations are divided into three categories:
medicolegal, institution-based, and private investigation. RANDY HANZLICK, DEATH
INVESTIGATION: SYSTEMS

AND PROCEDURES

11-12 (2007).

This Article focuses

on

investigations.
medicolegal
24
See Things to Know, supra note 9.
25 See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 9.

26See id at 8; Cyril H. Wecht, Legal Medicine and Forensic Science: Parametersof
in CriminalCases, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1996).
Utilization
27
Wecht, supra note 26, at 799-800. "If a carriage with six horses had been involved
in the negligent death of someone, if a ship had gone aground on the shoals and killed
some people and there was a cargo, these instruments of death might be confiscated and
taken by the king." Id at 799.
28
1d at 801; History, CORONERS' Soc'Y ENG. & WALES, https://www.coronersociety.
[https://perma.cc/C44S-W5JE].
org.uk/the-coroners-society/history/
29
See Wecht, supra note 26, at 799.
30
JENNIFER MOORE, CORONERS' RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PROMISE OF SAVED

LIVES 39 (2016) (describing the English coroner system and how it was transposed to the
colonies several centuries later); see also Wecht, supra note 26, at 799-800 (same).
31 MOORE, supra note 30, at 40.
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using their power for self-serving interests. 32 These changes did little to
improve the quality of the death investigation system, however; political issues
and scandals 33 continued to be a problem. 34 Catalyzed by consistent coroner
inadequacies and scientific advances, many states began to move away from
the traditional coroner system by adopting or supplementing their systems with
a medical examiner. 35 This shift to a medical examiner paradigm was aimed at
improving the quality of death investigations by requiring medical examiners
to meet certain qualifications, such as holding an advanced medical degree. 36
In addition, through model rules and ethical standards, states have attempted to
unify their death investigation systems across jurisdictions. 3 7 Despite these
various reform attempts, however, the death investigation system in America
remains disjointed at the state and county levels. 38

32

See id at 39 (noting that the credibility of coroners was reduced over time because
the office was over-politicized and filled with unqualified individuals).
33
See, e.g., Wecht, supra note 26, at 801-02.
34
MOORE, supra note 30, at 39 (illustrating how corruption in the coroner system
galvanized the reform movement).
35
See HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 42. For example, in 1877, Massachusetts
abolished the coroner system in favor of a medical examiner system, which required death
investigators to have medical experience. Paul MacMahon, The Inquest and the Virtues of
Soft Adjudication, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 282 (2015); see also Robert D. Felder,
Comment, A Coroner System in Crisis: The Scandals and Struggles PlaguingLouisiana

Death Investigation, 69 LA. L. REV. 627, 633 (2009) (stating that the first major reforms to
the coroner system in the U.S. occurred due to several scandals).
36
See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 23-24
(describing the benefits of instituting a medical examiner system over a coroner system,
including improved quality of death investigations, uniformity, and central administration).
37
1n 1928, the National Academy of Sciences first addressed the state of death
investigation, making specific recommendations: "(1) that the office of coroner be
abolished ... (2) that the medical duties of the coroner's office be vested in the office of
medical examiner; (3) that the office of medical examiner be headed by a scientifically
trained and competent pathologist." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 242 (2009)
[hereinafter A PATH FORWARD]; see also Andrea R. Tischler, Speaking for the Dead: A

CallforNationwide CoronerReform, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2004).
38
Tischler, supra note 37, at 557.
The first thing one must realize is that the word "system" is a misnomer, when
used in the context of death investigation in the United States. There is no "system" of
death investigation that covers the more than 3,000 jurisdictions in this country. No
nationally accepted guidelines or standards of practice exist for individuals
responsible for performing death-scene investigations. No professional degree,
license, certification, or minimum educational requirements exist, nor is there a
commonly accepted training curriculum. Not even a common job title exists for the
thousands of people who routinely perform death investigations in this country.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEATH INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE FOR THE SCENE INVESTIGATOR I

(1999).
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2. Modern Day Death InvestigationSystems
Today, death investigation systems exist primarily as coroner systems or
medical examiner systems, with some variations. Coroners and medical
examiners direct teams of experts that include professionals such as forensic
pathologists, forensic scientists, toxicologists, and scene investigators. 39 While
qualifications for coroners and medical examiners vary from state to state, the
death investigator's role remains constant: to examine suspicious and
unexplained deaths. There are four basic death investigation systems in the
United States: (1) a county-, district-, or parish-based coroner system; 40 (2) a
centralized medical examiner system; (3) a county- or district-based medical
examiner system; and (4) a hybrid/mixed system. 4 1 When deciding which type
of system to implement, jurisdictions weigh several factors, such as the
availability of existing and future funding, a state's population density,
qualified personnel, and a locality's organizational structure. 42
a. CoronerSystem
While there have been advances in medical technology, the framework
and purpose of the coroner system have remained relatively constant since it
came to America. Coroners today are still empowered to, among other things,
certify the cause and manner of unexplained or unnatural deaths. 4 3 In all
39

See HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 49 (listing the major disciplines of forensic
sciences); What Is a Coroner?, CRIMESCENEINVESTIGATOREDU, https://www.crimescene
investigatoredu.org/coroner [https://perma.cc/M5BW-9NBZ].
40
For this category, the CDC includes any state in which all counties, districts, and
parishes are served by a coroner, even if there is an overall state medical examiner's office.
Death Investigation Systems, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated

Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/coroner/death.html [https://perma.cc/
Z9AD-UMR2]. Some scholars categorize these types of states as hybrid/mixed. See
HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 89-97.
41
Death Investigation Systems, supra note 40. A hybrid/mixed system generally
means that the state has some coroners, but also has at least one county with a medical
examiner system. See HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 89.
42
See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 37, at 257 (noting that many death investigator
positions remain vacant "because of manpower shortages and/or insufficient funding of
pathologist positions"). In Georgia, the mayor may perform coroner duties in
municipalities with 5,000 people or fewer. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-1 (2016). In
Washington, in counties with fewer than 40,000 people, the local prosecutor is the exofficio coroner. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.16.030 (West 2003 & Supp. 2018). In
Wisconsin, cities with fewer than 500,000 residents are not allowed to have a coroner and
those with more than 500,000 have the option to have a coroner; two or more counties may
also institute a joint medical examiner system in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 59.20
(West 2013 & Supp. 2015).
43 There are currently fourteen states that have a county- district- or parish-based
coroner system. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-301 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-601
(2017); IDAHO CODE § 34-622 (Michie 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-2-14-2 (West 2006);
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coroner jurisdictions, the position of coroner is elected and must meet only the
most basic qualifications; generally, there are no age, education, or even
medical training requirements.44 Indiana, for example, requires only that the
county coroner reside in the state, attend a forty-hour training course within
six months of taking office, and take an eight-hour training course each year.4 5
Some states allow government officials-such as the sheriff, justice of the
peace, or prosecutor-to assume coroner duties in lieu of having a separate
office of the coroner. 46
b. Medical Examiner System
Unlike the coroner system, which requires few qualifications, the medical
examiner system adheres to strict education and medical training requirements.
A medical examiner is a forensic doctor who uses his or her medical expertise
when conducting death investigations, including performing autopsies.4 7
Moreover, medical examiners are civil servants as opposed to elected officials.
Because medical examiners have greater medical expertise than most coroners,
many states have abandoned their coroner system entirely or supplemented
that system with medical examiners. 48
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-226 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72.410 (LexisNexis
2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5701 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2901 (2015); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1820 (LexisNexis 2011); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 259.010 (LexisNexis
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-10-02 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-5-5 (2014); S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS § 7-7-1.1 (2004); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-4-101 (2017).
44But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-226 (2017) (requiring all coroners to be licensed
physicians).
45
46

IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-14-2, -22.3, -23 (West 2006 & Supp. 2015).
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1210 (LexisNexis 2011) ("The county

attorney shall perform all of the duties enjoined by law upon the county coroner and the
county attorney shall be the ex officio county coroner."); Death Investigation Systems,
supra note 40 (finding that Hawaii's chief of police is authorized to play a significant role
in a death investigation, and that justices of the peace in Texas can perform coroner duties).
This feature can also apply to coroners in a hybrid or mixed system. See, e.g., HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 841-1 (West 2008) ("The chief of police or his authorized
subordinate .. . shall, ex officio, be the coroner for his respective county.").
47
See What Is a Coroner?, supra note 39 (explaining that coroners may be medical
professionals and may perform autopsies). But see W. VA. CODE § 61-12-7 (2016)
(explaining that, in West Virginia, the office of medical examiner may be held by nonphysicians, such as nurses, paramedics, or physicians' assistants).
48
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have centralized medical examiner
systems. ALASKA STAT. § 12.65.015 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-406 (West
2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4704 (Michie 2017); D.C. CODE § 5-1402 (2001 & Supp.
2018); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,

§

3023 (2004 & Supp. 2017); MD. CODE ANN.,

HEALTH-GEN. § 5-306 (LexisNexis 2015); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 38, § 2 (LexisNexis 2006

§ 611-B:2 (2001 & Supp. 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-11-3 (LexisNexis 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-382 (2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 937 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.065 (2017); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 234-2
(2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-44 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
& Supp. 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
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Unlike the general standards for coroners, most jurisdictions require, at a
minimum, that medical examiners "be physicians licensed to practice
medicine.. . ."49 Other jurisdictions, like New Hampshire, impose more
significant educational standards, requiring that medical examiners be certified
pathologists.

50

In Massachusetts, the chief medical examiner must be a

physician licensed to practice in the Commonwealth and a graduate of an
approved fellowship program in forensic medicine with a certification in
anatomic pathology and subspecialty certification in forensic pathology.51
New Jersey, while similar to New Hampshire and Massachusetts, imposes
additional training, requiring thirty hours of basic education in death
investigation, sponsored by an institution of higher education or other agency
approved by the State Medical Examiner; a basic course conducted by the
Office of thQ State Medical Examiner; and seven full days of internship
training at the New Jersey State Medical Examiner Office. 52
While a medical examiner system is more reliable than the coroner system,
the diverse requirements from one jurisdiction to another prevent uniform
training across the country, leading to barriers to entry in a field that is greatly
in need of qualified professionals. Although many jurisdictions may prefer to
rely on medical examiners rather than coroners, there are not enough qualified
medical examiners in the United States to staff all of the open positions.53 The
strict requirements of the medical examiner system led to more comprehensive
death investigations, but those requirements also prevent many offices from
staffing all available positions. 54

18, § 507 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-277 (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-12-7
(LexisNexis 2014). Six states have county- or district-based medical examiner systems.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-592 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 406.05 (West 2016); IOWA
ADMIN. CODE r. 641-127.1 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 52.201 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-83 (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-9-101 (2016); see also
Death Investigation Systems, supra note 40 (noting that Tennessee allows for counties to
maintain a coroner system, but there are currently no active coroners).
49
See D.C. CODE § 5-1402; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3022 ("The Chief
Medical Examiner must possess a degree of doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathy, be
licensed to practice in the State and be expert in the specialty of forensic pathology.").
50
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 611-B:2.
51 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 38, § 2.
52
N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:49-7.1 (2018).
53
A PATH FORWARD, supra note 37, at 257-58 (explaining that, at this time, the
estimated need is for about 1,000 forensic pathologists; about 10% of available positions
are vacant because of manpower shortages). While seventy forensic pathology positions
become available each year, only 70% of those available positions are ultimately filled. Id
at 257. Many of these positions remain vacant due to lack of funding and manpower
shorta es. Id
5
See HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 42 (noting that the lack of qualified professionals
and unfilled positions leads to varying quality in death investigations).
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c. Hybrid Systems
Dispersed populations, a dearth of qualified medical examiners, and
inconsistent political will have led some states to employ a hybrid death
investigation system-one in which counties across a state vary in terms of
whether they use a coroner or medical examiner. 55 Alabama provides an
interesting example of this approach. It is statutorily classified as a coroner
system, 56 but in practice it qualifies as a hybrid system because at least three
counties abolished the office of the coroner and replaced it with the office of a
medical examiner. 57 The hybrid systems encapsulate the overall deficiencies
and lack of uniformity of the death investigation system.58 The patchwork of
laws and approaches employed across states causes confusion for those trying
to understand death investigations in America. 59
B. Prosecutors
The structure of the death investigation system gives prosecutors
enormous control over scientific evidence and testimony, which in turn helps
to further their case theories. This arrangement, coupled with a prosecutor's
largely unfettered discretion, creates great potential for abuse. Prosecutorial
discretion dictates the direction, outcome, and underlying mechanisms of
criminal cases. 60 Indeed, one federal district judge recently wrote that, "for the
immediate future at least, prosecutors, rather than judges, will be the real
rulers of the American criminal justice system. And I ask you: is that fair?" 6 1
Current constraints meant to lessen abuse of prosecutorial discretion fall
short of eliminating conflicts of interest and reducing prosecutorial control.
55Fifteen states currently have a hybrid/mixed system. ALA. CODE § 11-5-1
(LexisNexis 2008); ALA. CODE § 45-27-60 (2011); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 24010 (West 2003);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-406 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-80 (2016); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 841-1 (West 2008); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3003, -3044 (West
2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 390.005 (West 2005 & Supp. 2016); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-6157 (West 2007 & Supp. 2017); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 58.010, 58.700 (West 2017); N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 671 (McKinney 2017); O-1lo REV. CODE ANN. § 313.01 (LexisNexis 2016);
53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3092 (West 2016); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
49.02, .04, .25 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.16.030 (West 2003 & Supp.
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 59.20 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015).
56

ALA. CODE § 11-5-1.
57 See Death Investigation Systems, supra note 40.

58See Beth Pearsall, Improving Forensic Death Investigation, NAT'L INST. JUST.
https://www.nij.gov/joumals/267/pages/investigation.aspx
(Mar.
3,
2011),
[https://perma.cc/5KLW-LZ2E] (discussing the deficient death investigation system and
possible solutions).
59
60

See id
See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 291 (3d ed.

2008).
61 Jed S. Rakoff, Why ProsecutorsRule the CriminalJustice System-And What Can
Be Done About It, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2017).
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This Section explores the prosecutor's role in death investigations, how their
discretion increases their authority, and how existing constraints are
ineffective.
1. The Modern Prosecutor's Role in the Death Investigation
The modem prosecutor fulfills a dual role of an adversary and an agent of
the sovereign. As an adversary, the prosecutor's goal is to win the case; as an
agent of the sovereign, the prosecutor must seek both the conviction of the
guilty and the acquittal of the innocent. 62 In these dual roles, prosecutors have
significant discretion concerning whether to bring a case, what charges to file,
and what sentence to pursue. 63 During a death investigation, prosecutors work
closely with death investigators and law enforcement to determine the cause of
death and whether the state should seek charges.64 As part of this work,
prosecutors have control over scientific evidence, the ability to shape the facts,
and the power to persuade a factfinder of a defendant's guilt. A prosecutor's
dominion over criminal proceedings constrains the objectivity and
independence of the death investigation system, essentially situating death
investigators under the direct command of prosecutors.
One may think that, in a death investigation, the prosecutor steps in after
all of the evidence has been collected and the facts are set. In reality, however,
the prosecutor's influence commences at the beginning of the investigation. 6 5
The structure of the criminal justice system is such that death investigators and
prosecutors are intended to be independent entities. But they are housed under
the same governmental framework, thus placing them ostensibly on the same
team. 66 In some cases, they even work in the same building, further blurring
the lines of independence. 67 This architecture enables prosecutors to influence
62

&

See Charlie DeVore, Comment, A Lie Is a Lie: An Argument for Strict Protection
Against a Prosecutor's Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony, 101 J. CRM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 667, 667 (2011) (noting that prosecutors must balance the desire to achieve
legislative victories with justice and fairness); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
110-11 (1976) ("[T]hough the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with
earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client's overriding interest that
justice shall be done. He is the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
63
See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 60, at 291 (stating that prosecutorial discretion is
rooted in the separation of powers doctrine and that such discretion is "ill-suited to judicial
review" (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
6 See MIEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 31 (explaining

that after a suspected homicide, prosecutors consult with death investigators to determine
the manner, cause, and time of death).
65

66

See id.

See id at 33 (lamenting the control that prosecutors have over the death
investigators resulting from the institutional framework).
67
See id at 36-37 (arguing that death investigator offices should be removed from
departments of public safety like prosecutor and police offices in order to reduce conflicts
of interest).
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scientific evidence and testimony, sometimes creating substantial conflicts of
interest.
2. ProsecutorialDiscretion
Prosecutorial discretion is a key component of the criminal justice system.
Without this discretion, prosecutors' limited time and resources might be spent
on frivolous or unwarranted cases. 68 Discretion allows prosecutors to prioritize
cases according to the social and political priorities of the jurisdiction. 69 I a
practical sense, discretion may lead to more just outcomes because it allows
prosecutors to balance real life circumstances with black letter law. 70
Despite the need for prosecutorial discretion, the seemingly unlimited
ability of the prosecutor to control a case often results in the abuse of power. 7 1
Furthermore, there is no substantive check on a prosecutor's discretion; they
are accountable only to a supervisor who usually has the same goals and
interests, and public mechanisms generally are ineffective at holding
prosecutors accountable. 72 With a culture of winning at all costs and pursuing
convictions with zeal, prosecutors-knowingly or unknowingly-may cross
the line into questionable or illegal behavior, creating conflicts of interest. 73
Without meaningful standards or reform, prosecutorial misconduct and
questionable practices are rarely challenged. 74

68

ANGELA

J.

DAVIS,

ARBITRARY

JUSTICE:

THE

POWER

OF

THE

AMERICAN

PROSECUTOR 13 (2007). Nationwide, local criminal justice systems do not have enough
resources to pursue charges in every alleged criminal case. Id at 13-14; see also RONALD
J. ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4 (3d ed.

2016) (explaining that the availability of resources may force prosecutors to be selective in
choosing cases to prosecute).
69

See DAVID K. SHIPLER, RIGHTS AT RISK: THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY IN MODERN
AMERICA 108 (2012).
70

See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/BargainingTradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 30-35 (2002) (arguing that appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion, or
"screening," may result in only "appropriate charges" being filed, which can lead to a more
balanced and fair system).
71 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the

Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 397, 399 (2001).
72
1d. at 397 ("Most citizens know very little about the practices and policies of their
local prosecutor."); DAVIS, supra note 68, at 16.
73
DAVIS, supra note 68, at 16-18. "[E]ven well-meaning prosecutors often fail
because they exercise discretion arbitrarily and without guidance and standards, under the
daily pressures of overwhelming caseloads in a system with inadequate representation for
most defendants, and judges who are more interested in efficiency than justice." Id. at 16.
741Daniel Woislaw, Comment, Absolute Immunity: Applying New Standards for
ProsecutorialAccountability, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 349, 365-66 (providing data
reflecting the lack of professional and criminal liability and professional disciplinary action
for prosecutors who have engaged in prosecutorial misconduct leading to wrongful
convictions). But see Tony Saavedra, Prosecutors Who Falsify or Withhold Evidence
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3. Constraintson Prosecutors
Despite the prosecutor's apparently unlimited authority, there are
numerous constraints on prosecutorial discretion, from a defendant's right
against self-incrimination to due process protections. Most prevalent to the
death investigation system are standards that constrain prosecutors in their use
of scientific evidence and testimony. The standard set out in Brady v.
Maryland5 is a prime example of how evidentiary standards that require strict
disclosure may curb abuses of prosecutorial discretion. 7 6 Brady imposes an
affirmative obligation on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defendant and applies, for example, when prosecutors solicit false testimony or
allow false testimony to go uncorrected. 77 If a prosecutor fails in this
obligation, provided the issue at hand is material, the defendant is typically
entitled to a new trial. 7 8
In theory, standards such as Brady place a check on prosecutorial
discretion; in reality, however, these standards fall short of protecting the
innocent and fail to sufficiently condemn prosecutorial abuse. 79 When
examining an alleged Brady violation, courts require a finding of egregious
misconduct and require defendants to meet a nearly unattainable bar of
materiality. 80 Such insubstantial constraints mean that prosecutors are rarely
Could Become Felons Under ProposedState Legislation, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Aug. 11,

2016), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/county-725339-prosecutors-orange.html
[https://perma.cc/9D2D-JUBA] (describing proposed penalties of between sixteen months
and three years for prosecutors who intentionally falsify or withhold evidence).
75 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
76

In addition to the Brady standard, the Napue standard guides prosecutors in their
use of evidence and testimony. The Napue standard declares that a prosecutor's knowing
misuse of false evidence or testimony at trial is a violation of due process. See Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause bars prosecutors from knowingly presenting false testimony and obligates them to
correct such testimony when it occurs).
77
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."); see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 243 (2d ed.
2015) ("Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors is one of the most pervasive
forms of prosecutorial misconduct, and may account for more miscarriages of justice than
any other type of prosecutorial infraction.").
78
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (explaining that Brady holds
that suppression of material evidence by a prosecutor, regardless of good or bad faith,
"justifies a new trial").
79
See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the
Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIINOLOGY 415, 434 (2010) ("[T]he Brady

disclosure duty has become one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in the
criminal justice system.").
80
See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (indicating that a Brady violation results in a new
trial when the violation materially affects the outcome of a case); United States v. Reese,
745 F.3d 1075, 1083 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Evidence is material if there is a reasonable
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investigated or disciplined, even when a defendant's rights have clearly been
violated. 8 ' Since the standard is so high, most allegations fail to trigger a
Brady violation. Even well-meaning prosecutors, through their relationship
and access to death investigators, can bend the results of an investigation and
encourage the production of false or misleading evidence that may send an
innocent defendant to prison.
In addition to the difficulties associated with asserting a Brady violation,
statutory immunity serves to insulate prosecutors from misconduct charges.
Even when government officials act illegally or unethically, they generally
enjoy immunity as long as they are "acting within the scope of their
employment," regardless of the nature of the violation. 82 The provision of
immunity is an attempt to balance both the need to hold officials accountable
and the need to protect officials acting reasonably from "harassment,
distraction, and liability." 83 But just as disclosure obligations are ineffective at
holding prosecutors accountable, immunity shields prosecutors from
misconduct claims and lowers the bar of accountability. 84
The opportunity for the misuse of scientific evidence and testimony,
coupled with an unattainable immunity standard, complicates how prosecutors
interact with death investigators. The system is already structured in a way that
lends itself to conflicting interests for prosecutors and death investigators.
Without proper checks on that system, however, conflicts may go unchecked
or unresolved. On one level, the evidentiary standards established by courts
seem to indicate a willingness to address these problems. On another level,
though, the inability of the public to hold officials accountable cuts the other
way. The following Part highlights the improper association between
prosecutors and death investigators resulting from the failure of the constraints
on both offices.
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence
been disclosed. A reasonableprobability means the likelihood of a different result is great
enough to undermine confidence in the outcome." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
81 Cadene A. Russell, Comment, When Justice Is Done: Expanding a Defendant's
Right to the Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence on the 51st Anniversary of Brady v.
Maryland, 58 How. L.J. 237, 246-50 (2014) (discussing the shortcomings of Brady in
addressing prosecutorial misconduct and noting that the tendency to favor the government
"is evident where bar associations are not inclined to 'discipline prosecutors for even the
most egregious Brady violations"' (quoting Elizabeth Napier Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy
for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 1456 (2006))).
82
See Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784, 796 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)).
83
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
84
See Russell, supra note 81, at 267 ("Unfortunately, prosecutorial immunity is more
of a hindrance to effective Brady policies than it is a benefit."); Woislaw, supra note 74, at
349 (arguing that absolute immunity prevents the public from holding prosecutors
accountable for misconduct because it exempts prosecutors from civil liability for
violations of individual rights).
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III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The term "conflict of interest" elicits visions of outright corruption and
backroom deals. While conflicts of interest may be apparent in some
circumstances, they can also result from discreet pressures over time.8 5 It is
difficult to define or understand what constitutes a conflict of interest, 86 in part
because many professionals do not believe they could possibly fall victim to
inappropriate influences; as a result, they often overlook the subtle tensions in
their professional lives. 87 A conflict of interest occurs between a death
investigator and a prosecutor when one party submits to competing interests or
loyalties,8 8 whether knowingly or unknowingly, and it adversely affects an
individual's independent and professional judgment. 89
Prpsecutors and death investigators confront personal and institutional
pressures resulting in pervasive conflicts of interest that undermine their
independence and integrity. While the two offices have distinct goals, 90 the
prosecutor's commanding authority over medical evidence, combined with a
close relationship with the death investigator's office or the individual death
investigator on the case, gives the prosecutor overwhelming influence in the
relationship. 9 1 That influence may push the investigator to knowingly or

85 Don A. Moore et al., Introduction, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND
SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (Don A. Moore et al. eds.,
2005) [hereinafter CONFLICTS OF INTEREST].
86
Samuel Issacharoff, Legal Responses to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST, supra note 85, at 191.
87
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 85, at 3.
88
See Conflict of Interest, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
"conflict of interest" as "[a] real or seeming incompatibility between one's private interests
and one's public or fiduciary duties").
89
See People v. Clark, 261 P.3d 243, 343-44 (Cal. 2011) (acknowledging that there
can be actual and potential conflicts of interest); State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 476
(Tenn. 2003) (defining conflicts of interest as when a professional cannot exercise
judgment free of competing interests and loyalties); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTION
STORIES ch. 7 (2017) (discussing "the problem of divided loyalties" and conflicts of
interest in specific situations); BRENT E. TURVEY & STAN CROWDER, ETHICAL JUSTICE:
APPLIED ISSUES FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 265 (2013)
(explaining that conflicts of interest can include a need to satisfy multiple roles, duties, or
obligations).
90 During a death investigation, death investigators analyze scientific evidence to
determine the causes and surrounding circumstances of a death; in appropriate cases,
prosecutors then actively pursue a conviction. See HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 11
(discussing the role of death investigators within medicolegal death investigations);
Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1309, 1311-12 (2002) (discussing the historical
patterns of prosecutors actively seeking convictions).
91 See Davis, supra note 71, at 408 (explaining the far-reaching discretion and power
of prosecutors in criminal case outcomes); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific
Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) ("[T]he prosecutor
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unknowingly compromise his or her professional independence in many stages
of the investigation. These pressures result in overt conflicts of interest, such
as collusion between the two offices, 92 or unconscious and inappropriate
influence that threatens the integrity of the entire justice system. 93
Although conflicts of interest between prosecutors and death investigators
pervade the justice system, there has been very little focus on the conflicts
between the offices. Instead, scholars have focused on death investigator and
prosecutor misconduct separately. 94 This Section analyzes the interaction
between the two offices and what occurs when they are allowed to influence
each other without adequate oversight or consequences.
A. Overt and Apparent Conflicts ofInterest
From fraudulent medical exams to state cover-ups, there are many
examples of overt conflicts of interest in the death investigation field. Overt
conflicts of interest are clear and apparent instances of inappropriate influence
created by institutional structures and personal biases. 95 These conflicts may
be separated into two categories: when a prosecutor serves as a coroner 96 -an
inherent institutional conflict-and when at least one party knowingly acts due
to inappropriate influence 9 7-a combination of institutional and personal
biases. Institutional structures and personal biases allow each office to
influence the other and in turn blur the lines of duty, responsibility, and
independence. 98 Overt conflicts of interest are contrary to all principles of
justice and fair process.

dominates the system, has exclusive control of the evidence, and decides by himself how
that evidence will be used.").
92
See State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 847-48 (Minn. 2012) (exemplifying how
prosecutors may substantially interfere with and pressure death investigators).
93
See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217-18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (describing
a case in which a death investigator succumbed to implicit pressures).
94
See generally Davis, supra note 71, at 408 (examining the effects of prosecutorial
discretion); Felder, supra note 35, at 628-30 (providing an example of death investigators
who abuse their power); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-12 (2009) (highlighting
prosecutor's misuse of erroneous death investigator testimony); Gershman, supra note 91,
at 17 (discussing the prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence while pursuing criminal
convictions).
95
See, e.g., Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 528 (2d Cir. 2012) (illustrating the
structure that allows for overt conflicts to occur).
96
See infra Part II.A.1.
97
See infra Part II.B.2.
98
See Felder, supra note 35, at 628 ("Whether a mistake leads to the wrongful
conviction of the innocent, allows the guilty to go free, or allows an unjust award of
damages, the ramifications of an ineptly governed death investigation system are felt
throughout the entire justice system.").
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1. Allowing the Prosecutorto Serve as the Coroner Creates an Overt
Conflict ofInterest
A feature unique to the coroner system is that some jurisdictions allow
officials who already occupy a governmental position also to hold the position
of coroner, thus creating an inherent conflict of interest. Pursuant to state
statutes, officials such as sheriffs, 99 mayors, 0 0 prosecutors, 0 1 and justices of
the peace1 0 2 are permitted to hold the office of the coroner simultaneously.1 03
While states have enacted these statutes to promote efficiency, combat a lack
of medical expertise, and manage limited resources, conflicts of interest are
unavoidable.1 04 When the office that conducts the post-mortem death
investigation is the same office that pursues criminal charges against a suspect,
105
the traditionally independent offices often end up with contradictory goals.
99

See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 841-1 (West 2008) (permitting the chief of police to

serve as coroner in certain counties).
10 0
See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-1 (2016) (allowing mayors in municipalities with
populations less than 5,000 people to serve as coroners).
10 1

See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 23-1210 (2011) (mandating that the county attorney

perform the duties of the coroner); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-09-27 (2012) (establishing that
the sheriff or county manager can perform the duty of the coroner in rare circumstances);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.16.030 (West 2003 & Supp. 2018) (requiring the prosecutor
to serve as coroner in counties with populations under 40,000 people).
102
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.04 (West 2006) (stating that the justice of
the peace will perform the duty of the coroner). See generally Judy Melinek, Justice
Scalia's Unexamined Death Points to

a

Problem, CNN

(Feb.

20,

2016),

http://www.cnn.com/2016/
02/18/opinions/justice-scalia-no-autopsy-melinek/ [https://perma.cc/6W9E-V23U]
(discussing conflicts of interest arising from allowing the justice of the peace to issue
Justice Scalia's death certificate without visiting the scene or performing an autopsy).
10 3
Funeral directors can also serve simultaneously as coroners, thereby creating a
conflict of interest when funeral directors arrive at the scene of a crime to garner business.
See HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 19, 37.
1 0 4 See Skamania County Coroner, SKAMANIA COUNTY, http://www.skamaniacounty.

org/prosecutor/homepage/coroner/ [https://perma.cc/J24H-9ZN8] (stating that counties
with limited resources should combine the office of coroner and county prosecutor).
105
See State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 834 (Minn. 2012) ("[Fjorensic science is
not and should not become the sole province of the police and prosecutors. In the search for
truth and justice, forensic science must be 'equally available to law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, and defendants."' (quoting A PATH FORWARD, supra note 37, at 17)). For a

recent example of an alleged conflict of interest on the part of a sheriff who also served as
county coroner, see Julie Small, Autopsy Doctor Resigns, Says Sheriff Overrode Death
4,
2017),
(Dec.
NEWS
KQED
Officers,
Protect
to
Findings

https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/12/04/autopsy-doctors-sheriff-overrode-death-findingsto-protect-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/A84T-TJSA]. According to Dr. Bennet
Omalu, San Joaquin County, California's chief forensic pathologist, "The sheriff was using
his political office as the coroner to protect police officers whenever someone died while in
custody or during arrest.. . . I had thought that this was initially an anomaly, but now,
especially beginning in 2016, it has become routine practice." Id. Dr. Omalu added: "The
Sheriff does whatever he feels like doing as the coroner, in total disregard of bioethics,
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Allowing the prosecutor to serve as coroner creates an overt conflict
because one cannot completely compartmentalize the goals and obligations of
each position. On the one hand, prosecutors face pressure to maintain a high
conviction rate, while at the same time attempting to seek justice.1 06 On the
other hand, coroners aim to conduct thorough, objective death investigations
and provide accurate medical results. 107 A prosecutor who serves as coroner
may have difficulty balancing these goals and may be inclined to pursue a
theory of death that serves the purposes of the prosecution. As previously
discussed, prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in the criminal justice
system.1 08 Permitting the prosecutor to act as coroner eliminates a check on
prosecutorial discretion and provides the prosecutor with even more control
over the process. Affording one person this unbridled, virtually unregulated
power compromises the independence of each role and the ability to have an
objective, correct determination of death and a potentially unbiased trial.1 09
Nevertheless, state courts in Nebraska and Washington have upheld the
validity of this relationship. In 1941, in Sturgeon v. Crosby Mortuary, Inc., 110
for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
combining the coroner's office and the prosecutor's office." 1 The court
explained that the prosecutor serving as a coroner "constituted a reasonable
exercise of the powers of his office." 1 1 2 More recently, the Nebraska court
reiterated the position expressed in Sturgeon by explicitly stating that there is
no danger of a conflict of interest when a prosecutor serves as coroner because
the prosecutor's judicial duties are separate and distinct from its coroner
duties.11 3 While the Nebraska statute permits the prosecutor to serve as
coroner, the Washington State statute requires that the prosecutor serve as
coroner in cities with populations less than 40,000 people.11 4 Permitting or

standards of practice of medicine and the generally accepted principles of medicine." Id.;
see also Radley Balko, It's Time to Abolish the Coroner, WASH. PosT (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/12/12/its-time-to-abolish-thecoroner/ [https://perma.cc/EHK6-6Y4Z] (stating, inter alia, "[i]n 41 of [California's] 58
counties, the coroner's duties are automatically assumed by the elected sheriff").
1 06 DAVIS, supra note 68, at 141 (considering how prosecutors' offices "foster a culture
of winning at any cost").
1 0 7 HANZLICK, supra note 23, at 57.
1 0 8 See supraPart I.B.1.

109The American Bar Association has formulated standards for the use of expert
medical testimony; when a prosecutor acts as the coroner this standard cannot possibly be
met. See STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION r. 3-3.3
(AM. BAR ASS'N 1992).

1 10 299 N.W. 378 (Neb. 1941).
IllId at383.
1 12 1d The court noted the legislative intent to
at 382.
113
McKinney v. Okoye, 806 N.W.2d 571, 578
114 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.16.030 (West
with a population of less than forty thousand

provide efficiency and cost savings. Id.
(Neb. 2011).
2003 & Supp. 2018) ("[I]n each county
no coroner shall be elected and the

920

OHIOSTATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 79:5

requiring the prosecutor to serve as coroner eliminates the independence that
safeguards the fair outcome of death investigations.
While it may make superficial sense for cities with fewer resources and
smaller budgets to combine the role of prosecutor and coroner,1 15 the greater
concern for justice outweighs the relatively modest savings provided by
combining the roles.1 16 Efficiency and cost savings should not be pursued at
the expense of a thorough and accurate death investigation.
2. One Party or Both PartiesKnowingly Act Due to an Obvious Conflict
of Interest
In addition to the conflicts of interest that are apparent when a prosecutor
serves as coroner, there are opportunities for overt conflicts of interest between
prosecutors and death investigators even while serving in their individual
capacities. An overt conflict of interest exists when, at the time of the
interactions between the death investigator and the prosecutor, one or both
parties knowingly act due to inappropriate influence.1 17 These conflicts
manifest in situations in which a prosecutor actively pressures an investigator
to change or conceal the results of an investigation.1 18 In turn, the death
investigator knowingly compromises his or her duty and objectivity in support
of the prosecution. Further, prosecutors and death investigators may actively
work together to achieve a more favorable outcome for the prosecution.1 19
These cases reflect situations in which both offices allow competing interests
and loyalties to cloud their independent and professional judgment.
In State v. Beecroft,120 there was no dispute over whether the defendant
had stabbed her newborn infant and put the baby in the trash; the question
prosecuting attorney shall be ex officio coroner."). Once the population of a county attains
forty thousand, the coroner must be elected. Id.
115 Skamania County Coroner, supranote 104.
116 See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 26 (noting the
potential of coroners lacking knowledge or having conflicts of interest, "especially when
funeral directors, prosecutors or sheriffs act as coroners").
117
See Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of
Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEx. L. REv. 1051, 1068 (2013) (highlighting
the need for medical examiner independence from law enforcement agencies in order to
reduce conflicts of interest).
I18See id. at 1055 (discussing the ways in which a prosecutor can influence a death
investigation, such as influencing death investigator priorities and investigation
techniques).
I 9 For a modern example of a death investigator changing his results based on the
opinion of the prosecutor, see Patricia Wen, Medical Examiners Here Can Be a Jury of
One, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/08/20/lifeand-death-decision-without-supervision/gRzxpXjWQOgHY2y49Nb8LK/story.html
[https://perma.cc/CUT6-KAZ9] (highlighting the potential for conflicts of interest when
the death investigator and prosecutor work closely and the lack of oversight for death
investigations).
120 813 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 2012).
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instead was whether the infant had been born alive or dead. 12 1 The prosecution
maintained the former, making the horrific scene a murder. 122 With blind
ambition, the prosecution intimidated the defense team's death investigators,
preventing them from testifying in opposition to the prosecution's theory.1 23
The prosecution materially affected the outcome of the case by limiting the
defense team's access to resources and qualified death investigators, and by
threatening to dismantle the investigator's career and blackmail her
supervisors. 12 4 Since the prosecutor was willing to compromise his integrity
and the independence of his office, he made the defense team's experts so
fearful for their "professional and financial well-being," Beecroft was denied a
fair and just trial. 12 5
Intimidating death investigators because their testimony conflicts with the
prosecution's theory is an obvious conflict of interest. These issues are
exacerbated by the very structure of the death investigation system that allows
for the power of the prosecutor to go unchecked. The nature of the adversary
system is inherently contentious and matches competing experts against one
another. Both the prosecution and the defense should have equal access to
qualified and competent death investigators; in reality, however, the death
investigation system gives the prosecution a clear advantage. Allowing a
prosecutor to intimidate death investigators and experts, without repercussion,
not only chills what is intended to be an independent and adversarial system,
but also promotes faulty forensic science.
The structural and independence issues raised in Beecroft are further
exemplified through acts of collusion between prosecutors and death
investigators. In Rivas v. Fischer,12 6 a prosecutor and death investigator
colluded to produce a time of death that favored the prosecution's theory of a
murder. 127 The prosecution could not prove its case unless the death
investigator reexamined the autopsy report "with an eye toward expanding the
time of death."1 2 8 The investigator was motivated to please the prosecutor,
perhaps because the investigator hoped that his compliance would lead to the
121Id at 824.
122 Id

123Id. at 826-30; see also Julie Jonas, True Independence for Medical Examiners
Equals Due Processfor CriminalDefendants and More Efficiencies in the CriminalJustice
System, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 698, 712-13 (2011).
124

The prosecutor emailed the investigator's superior to say that it was unacceptable
for the investigator staff to testify for the defense team and that he would not support the
supervisor's campaign for coroner if the staff continued to testify. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d at
827-28. The prosecutor threatened to file a complaint against the death investigator with
the state agency and to keep her from ever teaching again at the state crime laboratory. Id
1251d at 840.
126687 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 2012).
1 27 Id. at 528.
128Id. at 521. "No matter how much circumstantial evidence the prosecution could
amass tending to link Rivas to the crime, however, it had no case unless it could prove that
[the victim] died [within the new timeframe]." Id at 524.
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dismissal of a pending criminal misconduct charge against him. 12 9 Situations
like this, in which a prosecutor actively and inappropriately engages a death
investigator to skew the autopsy findings in order to secure a conviction,
create clear conflicts of interest. Contrary to the purposes of the death
investigation system-including independence, objective outcomes, and
justice-death investigators are motivated to please prosecutors in order to
sustain business. Stretching science beyond a factual and accurate point only
produces a skewed and subjective system.
Inappropriate relationships between the death investigator and the
prosecutor often go unnoticed and, therefore, unsanctioned. When discovered,
however, the relationship provides a disturbing insight into how pervasive
collusion may be.1 30 In Mitchell v. Gibson,131 for example, the death
investigator, Joyce Gilchrist,1 32 worked with the prosecutor to hide
exculpatory evidence from the defense counsel, leading to a wrongful
conviction and a sentence of death. 133 Gilchrist knowingly gave false and
misleading testimony that DNA found on the victim matched that of the
defendant, permitting the prosecutor to obscure the truth and blind the jury
from contradictory reports to secure a conviction. 134 Gilchrist's unbridled
control over the medical evidence, combined with the prosecutor's ability to
capitalize on his close relationship with her, created a space for inappropriate
influence and misconduct. 13 5 The post-conviction trial court described this
conduct as "absolutely indefensible";1 36 the appellate court stated that it
"strikes a heavy blow to the public's 'trust in the prosecutor."'l 3 7 The court
granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and invalidated Mitchell's death
sentence on due process grounds.1 38
While the factors contributing to overt conflicts of interest described above
illuminate serious issues in the criminal justice system at large, they are only
part of the problem. In addition to outright collusion and intimidation tactics, it
129 See

id at 528 (stating that the defendant alleged that the medical examiner altered
the time of death to avoid prosecution for a pending misconduct charge).
1 30 See Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing how the

closeness of the prosecutor and death investigator's offices led to an attempt to cover up a
death investigator's illegal activity); Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir.
1987) (alleging that the coroner and prosecutor worked together to conceal an autopsy
report from the defense team); Ellingson v. Piercy, No. 2:14-CV-04316-NKL, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 76703, at *9-11 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2015) (discussing the potential cover-up

among the death investigator, the prosecutor, and the police department when the death
investigator failed to disclose all toxicology reports).
131 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001).
13 2 For further discussion concerning Gilchrist, see infra Part II.B.1.
133

Mitchell, 262 F.3d at 1060.

1 34 1d
13 5 Gershman, supra note 91, at 33.

1 36 Mitchell, 262 F.3d at 1060.
137 Id at 1064.
13 8
See id. at 1066.
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is an overt conflict of interest when a prosecutor knowingly elicits false
testimony from a death investigator. In Drake v. Portuondo,13 9 a jury
convicted the defendant on two counts of second-degree murder based largely
0
on the prosecution's false testimony from an expert witness. 14 The
prosecution team knew that it lacked evidence of motive, so they called a
psychologist at the last minute1 4 1 to testify about a so-called medical theory
known as "picquerism."l 42 The prosecution delayed notifying the defense
team about the additional witness the weekend before trial, thus giving the
defense minimal time to evaluate the witness and produce its own expert.1 4 3
Furthermore, the prosecutor "did not independently investigate [the expert's]
credentials or contact any other mental health professional to inquire about
picquerism" before putting him on the stand. 144
While a prosecutor should zealously seek a conviction, he or she should
not ignore evidence or testimony that is not grounded in facts or supported by
accurate and credible scientific evidence. The prosecutor in Drake knew that
picquerism was not a legitimate medical theory; nevertheless, he solicited the
investigator's testimony to win the case.1 4 5 The prosecutor elicited false
testimony to establish motive, and the investigator lied about his credentials
and provided false testimony.1 46 When a prosecutor and the death investigator
act for personal or professional gain, it creates a serious conflict of interest.
Similarly, in Miller v. Pate,147 the prosecutor knowingly elicited, and the
death investigator willingly provided, false testimony to support the
prosecution's argument.1 4 8 The prosecutor pursued a case theory that focused
on a pair of blood-stained shorts that were found near the crime.1 4 9 He claimed
the shorts tied the defendant to the murder of an eight-year-old girl.1 50 The
death investigator intentionally lied on the stand by asserting that the shorts
139 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009).
140I[d at 233.
' 4 1 Id.

1421d at 235 (defining picquerism as "a purported syndrome or criminal profile in
which the perpetrator realizes sexual satisfaction from penetrating a victim by sniper
activity or by stab or bite wounds"). The prosecutor knew that picquerism was not a
legitimate medical theory and intentionally elicited the death investigator's testimony about
his unsubstantiated theory and his false testimony about his involvement in the case. Id. at
243.
14 3
See id (noting that the prosecution gave the defense only one day's notice of its
intent to call the death investigator).
144Id at 235.
145 Drake, 553 F.3d at 243-44.
1 46 See id. at 238-39; see also Charles Patrick Ewing, False Credentials Cause
Extensive Fallout, 34 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 84 (2003) (describing how the death
investigator's false credentials contributed to the unfortunate outcome of the case and
encouraging prosecutors to carefully vet their experts' rdsum6s).
147 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (unanimous opinion).
14 8d at 6-7.
149I[d at 3-4.
150 Id
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were stained with Type A blood, the victim's blood type, rather than Type 0
blood, the defendant's blood type.1 5 1 The prosecution did not allow the
defense team to test the shorts, which gave the prosecutor and the death
investigator exclusive control over key medical evidence. 152 As a result of the
prosecutor's and investigator's repeated lies and misstatements, the jury found
the defendant guilty and sentenced him to death. 153 The case was ultimately
appealed to the Supreme Court, where it became evident that the shorts were
stained with paint, rather than blood, and that the prosecutor, the investigator,
and nearly everyone on the government's side knew at trial that the shorts did
not have blood stains. 154 The prosecutor and the death investigator had
colluded by repeatedly misconstruing and lying about the key medical
evidence.
Whether prosecutors actively approach a death investigator, or the two
offices conspire, the foregoing cases demonstrate how pervasive overt
conflicts of interest are throughout the criminal justice system. Until steps are
taken to reform and implement oversight in the existing system, this type of
conflict of interest between death investigators and prosecutors will continue.
More broadly, a system that gives prosecutors exclusive control over death
investigators and their scientific findings creates serious doubt that prosecutors
will appropriately manage non-scientific evidence such as confessions and
eyewitness testimony. 155
B. Discreetand Non-Obvious Conflicts ofInterest
While overt conflicts of interest are detrimental to the justice system, most
conflicts result from more discreet and subtle circumstances. These conflicts
tend to occur when one party is not fully aware that his or her decisions are
motivated by competing pressures and improper influence. 156 The death
investigation structure allows investigators and prosecutors to develop a close
working relationship, allows them to work in the same building, and permits

151 Id. at 4, 6 (explaining that the prosecutor knew the entire time that he had presented
false evidence and "deliberately misrepresented the truth").
152 Miller, 386 U.S. at 5.
1 5 3 Id at 2.

1 54 See id at 6-7.
1 55 Gershman, supra note 91, at 18.
Clearly, if a prosecutor bent on winning at all costs is able to manipulate technical
and seemingly objective "scientific" evidence, how much more likely is it that the
prosecutor will be able to misuse more subjective and easily manipulated nonscientific evidence such as confessions to police, eyewitness identifications, and the
testimony of informants, accomplices, and jailhouse "snitches?"

Id.

156See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 37, at 185 (recognizing that improper influence
can manifest in a pro-prosecution bias); CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 85, at 3.
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both offices to promote a similar agenda.1 57 Over time, prosecutors exert
subtle influence over death investigators and gain privileged access that
defense teams are routinely denied. 15 8
After years of working together and developing a rapport, death
investigators begin to view themselves as part of the prosecution team and
may develop a pro-prosecution bias, which is contrary to the goals of an
independent death investigation system. 159 This in-group bias causes death
investigators to shape results to help prosecutors and leads prosecutors to
capitalize on that bias. 160 To understand how underlying pressures lead death
investigators to compromise their independence and objectivity, it is necessary
to examine the careers of some infamous offenders. By examining a death
investigator's career, it is easy to see how the constant underlying pressure and
close relationship with prosecutors can cause a gradual shift in objectivity and
how, in the long run, these characters become oblivious to such implicit
biases.

1. Joyce Gilchrist
Perhaps one of the most notable characters in the death investigation
system who exemplifies the issue of pro-prosecution bias resulting in conflicts
of interest is Joyce Gilchrist. 16 1 Throughout her career, Gilchrist worked solely
with prosecution teams as a death investigator, conducting investigations and
serving as an expert witness. 162 Over time Gilchrist developed what seemed to
be a pattern of delaying evidence, severely disadvantaging defense teams, and
testifying beyond the scope of her knowledge; all of her tactics appeared to
157 See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 837, 849-56 (2004) (arguing that inherent conflicts of interest exist when
offices with varying incentives work closely together).
158 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:
The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 473-74
(1997) (explaining that for most defendants it is difficult to obtain defense experts).
1 59 See Conor Friedersdorf, CSI Is a Lie, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/csi-is-a-lie/390897/ [https://perma.cc/
NJ5A-JH3L] (stating that "medical examiners . .. typically work for the government and
are generally seen as part of the prosecution's 'team,' much like the police and
investigators").
160
See Gershman, supra note 91, at 31. In fact, a culture of "winning at all costs" may
push prosecutors to misuse and manipulate evidence and testimony. Id. at 18.
161 See Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Ethical Considerationsin the Use of
Expert Testimony: Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493,

1498 (2007) (describing Gilchrist as an example of a "corrupt expert"); Belinda Luscombe,
When the Evidence Lies, TIME (May 13, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0917110962500.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (reporting on
Gilchrist's infamous cases as a forensic scientist with the Oklahoma City police
department).
1 62 See Luscombe, supra note 161 (describing several instances in which Gilchrist's
findings were called into question for their accuracy).
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favor the prosecution. 163 Gilchrist repeatedly disobeyed court orders to
conduct tests that could have cleared defendants and failed to turn over
evidence to defense teams. 1 Moreover, prosecutors knew or should have
known that Gilchrist's testimony and work were inaccurate. Despite her
extensive history of misconduct and bias, however, they still chose to employ
her as an expert because her pattern of behavior was an asset to prosecution
teams. 165
These conflicts of interest resulted from improper influence and the
inappropriate relationship between Gilchrist's office and the prosecution team.
Her legacy includes false testimony regarding medical evidence, false
imprisonment of innocent defendants, and possibly even the execution of
innocent people. 166 By exploiting Gilchrist's pro-prosecution bias, prosecution
teams undermined their responsibility to the justice system. Gilchrist's actions
shed light on how discreet conflicts of interest manifest over time and are the
result of gradual influence creating an inherent bias, rather than manifesting as
an overt attempt to advantage prosecutors.1 67 When death investigators, such
as Gilchrist, experience pressure from prosecutors or are made to feel part of
the prosecution team, each office's independence is compromised.
1 63 See generally Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (involving
Gilchrist in a non-death investigation case); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1990) (same); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217-19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(highlighting Gilchrist's behavior of delaying evidence and testifying beyond her
qualifications in a death investigation case).
164 A prime example of Gilchrist's transgressions is exemplified in McCarty v. State,
765 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). Gilchrist delayed testing evidence for a firstdegree murder conviction for four years and did not finish her examination until the Friday
before a Monday trial, precluding the defense team from obtaining an independent review
of her findings. Id at 1217. This delay appeared to be a strategy to aid the prosecution's
theory and disadvantage the defense team. Further, she went on to discredit any
independent examinations that the defense team could find, stating that they could not
possibly have had time to properly examine the evidence. Id at 1217-18. In addition, she
stated at trial that, although she was unqualified to give an opinion about whether the
appellant was at the scene of the crime, the DNA evidence showed that he was, in fact,
there. Id at 1218-19. The court found that the County's District Attorney's Office placed
undue pressure on Gilchrist to give an expert opinion beyond the scope of her knowledge;
that led to prosecutorial comments "so prejudicial as to adversely affect the fundamental
fairness and impartiality of the proceedings." Id at 1219 n.1, 1221. After this trial, a formal
complaint of misconduct was filed against Gilchrist, but no disciplinary action was taken.
Id at 1219.
1 65 Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 161, at 1501 ("Given the many signals that her
testimony was corrupt, prosecutors should have stopped using her as a witness. . . . '[T]he
district attorney's office loved having her as a witness."').
166
To add gravity to this issue, twenty-three of the cases Gilchrist worked on were
death penalty cases, eleven of which have led to execution. Now there is no way to re-test
Gilchrist's results, possibly exonerating any innocent defendants. See Luscombe, supra
note 161.
167
See id (reporting on Gilchrist's bewilderment that people have negative
perceptions of her work as a death investigator).
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2. FredZain
A "super star" who could find evidence when no one else could and
always gave prosecutors a win, death investigator Fred Zain's experience
highlights how pro-prosecution bias corrupts the system and how
untrustworthy scientific evidence is endemic. While Zain appeared to be a
scientific genius to some people, he turned out to be a massive fraud who
falsified results in as many as 134 cases. 16 8 Zain may have been driven by a
distorted sense of justice. to help prosecutors, criticizing other death
investigators for being too conservative when examining evidence. His
"talent," however, only hurt defendants and victims. Inadvertent errors and
exaggeration may seem like negligible nudges that help the prosecution, but
they are actually measured actions that can add up to massive fraud.
Compounding the effects of Zain's errors, prosecutors capitalized on his
results and never questioned those results that favored their side. 169
Even more concerning than Zain's conduct is that the system allowed
these conflicts to occur and remain unchecked. When Zain should have
presented accurate and reliable scientific evidence, his relationship with
prosecutors and his underlying bias pushed him to find what other death
investigators could not. Because prosecutors and investigators are able to form
a close working relationship, the line of independence is blurred, leading
investigators such as Zain to present fraudulent pseudo-science as credible.
The system accepts forensic evidence as proffered by experts; and without
placing checks on how evidence is examined or presented, conduct like Zain's

16 8

See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to

Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REv. 163, 172 (2007).
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the strength of
results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of
evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of
evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item
had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly
altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression
that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to
resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing
supported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or

improbable results.
Id at 172-73.
169
Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 161, at 1497 ("[O]ne serologist 'testified that
at least twice after Zain left the lab, evidence on which [the serologist] had been unable to
obtain genetic markers was subsequently sent to Texas for testing by Zain, who again was
able to identify genetic markers."').
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can result in a "systematic practice rather than an occasional inadvertent
error."1 70

3. Dr. Steven Hayne
Another example of how pro-prosecution bias corrupts the system is Dr.
Steven Hayne, who fabricated medical evidence and case theories in favor of
the prosecution.171 Dr. Hayne consistently came up with outlandish methods
and theories that aided the prosecution. For example, he replicated gunpowder
marks by test-firing on canine skin in order to determine the distance between
the shooter and the victim; he also compared teeth marks in a partiallydigested bologna sandwich to a suspect's mouth. 172 Not only did Dr. Hayne
fabricate theories, but he also performed 257% more autopsies than allowed by
the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME), which severely
affected the quality of his work. 173
While Dr. Hayne is not innocent in his involvement in the foregoing
incidents, his actions represent a larger problem in the death investigation
system. Abuse of death investigator findings "are not unique to Mississippi,
and are able to persist because scientific testimony is too often viewed with
uncritical reverence and because the people affected by its misuse usually have
170

Kathleen Keough Griebel, Fred Zain, the CSI Effect, and a PhilosophicalIdea of
Justice: Using West Virginia as a Model for Change, 114 W. VA. L. REv. 1155, 1185
(2012).
171 One of the most glaring examples involved Dr. Hayne creating a two-shooter
theory to the exclusion of a single-shooter theory. Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787, 791
(Miss. 2007). This fabricated explanation directly aligned with the prosecution's theory of
the case. Id. at 792. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that Dr. Hayne's testimony was
not based on scientific methods and, pursuant to the court's standards, that the two-shooter
theory should not have been admitted at trial. Id See generally K.C. Meckfessel Taylor et
al., CSI Mississippi: The Cautionary Tale of Mississippi'sMedico-Legal History, 82 Miss.
L.J. 1271 (2013) (discussing the problems in Mississippi's death investigation system, with
a specific focus on Dr. Hayne's misdeeds); Radley Balko, Steven Hayne, Michael West
'Expert' Witness Scandal Could Affect Mississippi Attorney General Race, HUFFPOsT

(Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/radley-balko/steven-hayne-michael-westforensic-scandal b 940767.html [https://perma.cc/AC47-2TAW] (describing Dr. Hayne as
a "gun[ for hire, willing to say on the witness stand whatever prosecutors need in order to
win a conviction").
172
See Meckfessel Taylor et al., supra note 171, at 1290-93 (describing the various
outlandish techniques that Dr. Hayne employed in his work).
173Id at 1281. Dr. Hayne's workload was so egregious that in one case he completed a
report on a spleen that had been removed from the body years earlier. Id. at 1282-83. In a
recently published book that is highly critical of the Mississippi death investigation system
and Dr. Hayne in particular, one of the authors wrote: "Until and unless the state engages
in a thorough, top-down investigation of [his] work, we may never know the extent of the
damage [he] may have done. So far, the people with the power to initiate such an
investigation haven't shown much interest." RADLEY BALKO & TUCKER CARRINGTON, THE
CADAVER KING AND THE COUNTRY DENTIST: A TRUE STORY OF INJUSTICE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH xvi (2018).
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little support or sympathy." 74 A system that allows for both overt and nonobvious conflicts of interest cries out for change.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The current structure of the death investigation system and the ways in
which it is intertwined with the criminal justice system is susceptible to
conflicts of interest that inhibit the fair and effective administration of justice.
These conflicts, both overt and discreet, are caused by the inadequate
oversight of officials and the unregulated working relationships between death
investigators and prosecutors. While the potential for conflicts may never be
entirely eliminated due to of the repeat nature of the actor's interactions, steps
can be taken to reduce conflicts substantially. True independence is necessary
in order to restore the separate and distinct goals of each office. To prevent
circumstances in which death investigators present exaggerated or tainted
science and testimony, the system must implement strict education and
accreditation requirements. Achieving these important goals depends on the
establishment of a pure medical examiner system and a federal agency to
oversee and balance the relationship between death investigators and
prosecutors.
Curbing conflicts and potential abuses means divorcing the death
investigators' offices from the prosecutors' offices. The structure of the death
investigation system provides prosecutors with privileged access to forensic
evidence and allows them to influence death investigators, ultimately
substantially disadvantaging criminal defense teams. Permitting prosecutors
and death investigators to be housed under the same governmental
framework- inducing death investigators to feel part of the prosecution team
and even allowing both entities to occupy the same space-compromises their
independence.1 75 Without real independence, death investigators will remain
under the authority of prosecutorial agencies, subject to administrative and
political pressure. 176 Independence thus requires providing death investigators
with their own space, allowing defense teams equal access to medical experts
and evidence, and introducing oversight to hold prosecutors accountable. By
removing death investigators from the umbrella of the prosecutor, death
investigators can focus on providing objective and accurate medical evidence.
Ensuring independence may require more collaboration between prosecutors
174

Campbell Robertson, Questions Left for Mississippi Over Doctor'sAutopsies, N.Y.

TIMES (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/us/questions-for-mississippi-

doctor-after-thousands-of-autopsies.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (describing
the negative perceptions toward criminal defendants by both prosecutors and society at

large).

175

See generally Laurin, supra note 117, at 1052-54.
17 6 See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 33; Laurin,
supra note 117, at 1065 (stating that death investigators and crime laboratories should be
independent from administrative and prosecutorial control).
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and death investigators, but the need for objectivity outweighs the "thoughtful
calibration" required to guarantee independence.1 77
Improving the accuracy of the death investigation system also requires
strengthening educational requirements and training for death investigators. At
present, there is no uniform curriculum or consensus of what educational
requirements should guide death investigators, even within an individual state
system. The result is a fragmented death investigation system.1 78 With current
death investigation offices overwhelmed with a backlog of autopsies,1 79 a
system without a standardized educational baseline could mean that the
innocent get convicted or the guilty go free. The foundation for a competent
and accurate death investigation system starts with knowledgeable and trained
professionals to staff each office. The lack of real training and education,
however, means that the burden of developing competent death investigators
falls to on-the-job training, which is often insufficient due to the cycle of
undereducated and undertrained professionals currently working in these
offices. 8 0
Establishing mandatory accreditation and certification processes for death
investigators can further improve the reliability and accuracy of medical
evidence. Currently, accreditation and certification are voluntary efforts by
death investigation offices to follow recommended standards that establish
quality control measures and death investigator proficiency. 18 1 Mandatory

17 7

&

See Laurin, supra note 117, at 1112.
1 78 See Felder, supra note 35, at 643-44 (explaining that the gaps and issues in
Louisiana's death investigation system resulted from inadequate education and training
requirements); see also supra Part I.A.2.
17 9
Katharine Q. Seelye, As Overdose Deaths Pile Up, a Medical Examiner Quits the
Morgue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/us/drugoverdose-medical-examiner.html [https://perma.cc/T3ZT-ETVV] (highlighting the opioid
epidemic and the "tsunami" of bodies needing autopsies and creating a backlog for death
investigation offices across the country).
180 Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Needfor Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L.
TECH. 109, 124-27 (1991) (discussing how poor education and training are pervasive
issues in the forensic science field). Compounding this issue is the lack of interest in
forensic science and death investigation. To help meet these requirements, states should
improve undergraduate and graduate forensic science programs and create incentives for
students to pursue these fields through scholarships and fellowships. See A PATH
FORWARD, supra note 37, at 27-28 (noting that improved education programs will help
"correct some of the existing deficiencies" of the death investigation system). "Federal
crime labs (97%) were more likely than state (83%), municipal (75%), and county (51%)
labs to have written standards for performance in 2014." Andrea M. Burch et al., BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250152, PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC
LABORATORIES: QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES, 2014, 5 (2016), available at

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pffclqapl4.pdf.
181 The National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) prepares and sets
accreditation standards to help improve the quality of death investigations. See Inspection
and Accreditation, NAT'L ASS'N MED. EXAMINERS, https://netforum.avectra.com/eweb/
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accreditation and certification would ensure that death investigation offices are
effectively managed and that only qualified individuals have dominion over
medical evidence. 182 Accreditation would require an impartial third party to
determine whether an office meets the established quality control measures.1 83
Certification would require an individual to prove that he or she is qualified
and obtained the necessary education and training. 184 A regime that requires
knowledgeable professionals and competent offices buttresses the entire
justice system.
In addition to strengthening qualifications for individual death
investigators, instituting a nationwide medical examiner system would ensure
that deaths are evaluated by qualified medical professionals, would create
more uniform requirements, and would reduce conflicts of interest that
pervade the system. This shift requires abolishing the coroner system. Many
coroners are unprepared and incapable of meeting the basic goal of a death
investigation: assessing the cause, timing, and manner of a suspicious or
unexplained death.185 Coroners are often elected without any medical
education or expertise and are therefore unqualified to perform the duties of
the position. 186 Not only are some coroners underqualified, but some also have
misconceptions about the value and purpose of their role and may be
motivated by reelection and a desire to please stakeholders or superior
[https://perma.cc/W4LY-7BYY].
DynamicPage.aspx?Site-name&WebCode=Accred
These standards apply to offices and systems, rather than to individuals, and provide
minimum standards to which the systems should comply. Id The NAME standards are
voluntary, however, and merely represent an endorsement by the association that the
accredited system or office meets NAME's standards. Id
1 8 2 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCL,
STRENGTHENING THE MEDICOLEGAL-DEATH-INVESTIGATION SYSTEM: ACCREDITATION AND
CERTIFICATION-A PATH FORWARD 2 (2016) [hereinafter ACCREDITATION AND
at
available
CERTIFICATION],

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/strengtheni
[https://perma.cc/D7VNng the medicolegal death investigation systemfinal.pdf
2CYR].
183Id. at 2-3. The two premier crime lab accreditation organizations are the American
Society of Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board, International
(ASCLD/LAB, International) and Forensic Quality Services-International (FCSInternational). As of 2014, 66% of municipal and 78% of county crime labs, as compared
with 97% state and 67% federal crime labs, were accredited by the ASCLD or FCSInternational. Burch, supra note 180, at 2-3 & tbl. 1.
18 4

ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 182, at 3. In 2014, 5% of

municipal and 8% of county crime labs, as compared with 7% of state and 39% of federal
crime labs, tested the proficiency of forensic personnel through blind examinations.
Additionally, federal crime labs were more likely to conduct random case reanalysis than
publicly funded labs in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, during 2014, 72% of crime labs
employed at least one externally certified analyst. Burch, supra note 180, at 4-5.
18 5

See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 29-30

(discussing the hesitation and inability of coroners to conduct autopsies compared to
medical
examiners in cases such as heart attacks, burned bodies, and possible homicides).
86
I

A PATH FORWARD, supranote 37, at 49.
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government officials. 18 7 An electoral system rife with conflicts of interest and
misconduct makes medical examiners the preferred choice of death
investigators.1 88 Furthermore, evaluating the cause of death is a medical
determination that requires a medical professional.1 89 Medical examiners,
unlike coroners, are qualified to conduct autopsies and, because of their
extensive medical education, they know what is medically plausible; they are
more likely, therefore, to question what may appear to be a natural death. 190
Finally, medical examiners are the preferred death investigator because they
are hired, rather than elected officials. 19 1 For these reasons, according to one
knowledgeable commentator, "[t]he coroner system isn't just an anachronism;
it's an anachronism that never made much sense in the first place. It's well
past time to get rid of it."1 92
An independent, science-based, uniform death investigation system is
dependent on the creation of a federal agency or an office within an existing
agency to oversee the death investigation system.1 93 This federal agency
would implement national standards for death investigators, require sciencebased death investigations, develop regulations for managing misconduct, and
implement incentives to encourage medical students to enter the pathology
field, ultimately improving the accuracy and reliability of death
187 In a New York county coroner race, for example, candidates were interviewed

about why they were running for the position. All of the candidates indicated that they
wanted to help grieving families, rather than solve and explain mysterious and suspicious
deaths. See Sarah Harris, Run for Coroner, No Medical Training Necessary, NPR (Nov. 3,

2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/03/242416701/run-for-coroner-no-medical-trainingnecessary [https://perma.cc/H8SX-8F6M].
I 88 See Associated Press, Ex-Coroner: Elected System Can Mean Conflicts of Interest,
WASH. TIMES (June 7, 2015), [hereinafter Ex-Coroner] http://www.washingtontimes.com/

news/2015/jun/7/ex-coroner-elected-system-can-mean-conflicts-of-in/
[https://perma.cc/49SF-VUVM] (asserting that coroners should be appointed rather than
elected, due to conflicts of interests between coroners and funeral directors).
1 89 Pearsall, supra note 58.
190

See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 30. For

example, a medical examiner is more likely than a lay coroner to conduct an autopsy in a
case in which a 30-year-old died from an alleged heart attack. Id The medical examiner
would be more inclined to do an autopsy because the medical examiner would know that
this cause of death was medically implausible. Id
191Id at 25; see also Ex-Coroner, supra note 188 (asserting that coroners should be
appointed rather than elected because of conflicts of interests between coroners and funeral
directors). Opponents of this position may argue that elections are beneficial because they
give coroners autonomy to take positions that are in line with their constituents, rather than
be pressured by other elected officials. See MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM,
supra note 10, at 26.
192
Balko, supra note 105.
193
A PathForwardrecommended that a new federal agency should be created because
existing agencies do not have the bandwidth or the "appropriate mission" to take on issues
related to the forensic science community. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 37, at 18. The

report noted that agencies that are already working on forensic science issues should
continue those projects. Id
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investigations.1 9 4 Federal regulation and oversight would eliminate the
existing patchwork of laws that govern death investigations at the state and
local level. Holding all death investigators accountable under the federal
95
standard would deter misconduct and reduce the misuse of scientific data. 1
While a federal death investigation system would improve the integrity
and accuracy of death investigations, it could also promote information
sharing between other agencies. 19 6 For example, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration uses death investigation data to monitor trends in traffic
related accidents, and the CDC and the Food and Drug Administration use
data to monitor trends in drugs and diseases. A federal system would create an
information sharing database among the federal government, states, and
localities, thus providing comprehensive death statistics and, in turn, helping
underfunded and understaffed offices direct resources appropriately.1 97
V. CONCLUSION
The death investigation system in the United States has evolved over time,
growing out of centuries-old traditions in England. But this outdated
framework has not kept pace with changing societal values and scientific
advances. The current system is fragmented and inconsistent across county
and state lines, leading to situations like Justice Scalia's death in which local
laws can reduce an investigation having national and political implications to a
telephone call. 19 8 This Article does not mean to imply foul play in Justice
Scalia's death; rather, the death-assessment practices established in the small
194

See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING THE MEDICOLEGAL-DEATH-INVESTIGATION SYSTEM: IMPROVING DATA
SYSTEMS 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/NSTC/strengthening_themedicolegal-death investigation system_final.pdf.
195Id. Ethical codes instruct analysts on best practices and ensure that analysts work

within the confines of their expertise, provide objective findings, avoid conflicts of interest,
and prevent susceptibility to outside influences. Burch, supra note 180, at 5. During 2014,
state crime labs (98%) were more likely to have a written code of ethics than county (94%),
municipal (87%), and federal (85%) crime labs. Id

&

196
The Obama Administration's Committee on Medicolegal-Death-InvestigationSystem released a report in 2016 concluding that many federal agencies rely on death
investigation data to implement federal policy. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 194, at 2. The National Commission on Forensic
Science similarly recommended that the Department of Justice create a permanent office of
Medicolegal Death Investigation to improve the death investigation system by coordinating
support for death investigation systems and improving the quality of those systems across
the country. Id at 1. In addition, the Attorney General should seek funding to modernize
existing technologies and recruit and retain forensic pathologists. Id. at 2.
197 In 2011, 55% of death investigation facilities needed additional equipment or
renovations.
Sci.
WORKING
GRP.
FOR
MEDICOLEGAL-DEATH-INVESTIGATION,
INFRASTRUCTURE COMM., MEDICOLEGAL AUTOPSY FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(2011), availableat http://www.swgmdi.org/images/iscomrpt3-facilities20l .pdf.
198
See Kelly, supra note 4.
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Texas county in which he died are not in step with the national ideals to which
we should hold our death investigators, whether in the death of such an
important public figure or a private individual.
The typical structure of governmental branches responsible for death
investigations and prosecution are such that they tend to be physically aligned,
by being housed in the same offices, and/or outcome-aligned, because they
operate under the prosecutorial umbrella. The proximity of death investigator
and prosecutor offices can create both overt and discreet conflicts of interest
that result in fundamental miscarriages of justice. These examples of conflicts
obviously go against traditional notions of justice because they can involve
outright collusion between death investigators and prosecutors, or even
involve prosecutors serving directly as coroner. These types of situations
prevent accurate and fair outcomes, because the conflicts resulting from that
result directly harm the families of the victim and reduce the suspect's
opportunities for a fair trial. Perhaps even more sinister than these overt
conflicts are discreet conflicts that manifest over time through subtle influence
and pro-prosecution bias. The physical and organizational proximity of the
death investigator and prosecutor offices, combined with the repeated use of
death investigative services by prosecutors, may create bias in favor of
reaching the government's theory in individual cases. This Article provides
examples of particular death investigators who compromised their
independence in order to give the prosecution an advantage in multiple cases;
without question there are many similar stories that go unreported and
undetected. These discreet non-obvious conflicts of interest put defense teams,
and thereby defendants, at a substantial disadvantage: death investigators may
be more willing to give favorable treatment to prosecutors, or even obscure
exculpatory results.
The existing mechanisms designed to alleviate some of these issues, such
as evidentiary standards, are constrained by official immunity and prevent the
public from holding death investigators and prosecutors accountable. To
alleviate conflicts of interest and overcome the shortcomings of the existing
constraints, this Article advocates for the creation of a federal agency to create
uniformity and to oversee the death investigation system. As part of the
agency's role, death investigators would be subject to uniform education and
training requirements, and death investigators and their laboratories would be
required to meet certain accreditation and certification standards to ensure that
the actors are qualified. In addition, through accreditation or other means,
death investigator offices need to be truly independent from prosecutor offices.
Whether this means physically separating the two or providing defense teams
with equal access to resources, the current system favors prosecutors too
heavily. Finally, as much as possible, the agency should oversee the
elimination of the coroner system. Outdated and out-of-touch, the coroner
system simply does not have the same capabilities as the medical examiner
system. It is possible that elected coroners may be qualified, but too often they
are not, and it is the victims and defendants who suffer.
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Perhaps the problem is lack of political will, or funding, or inertia, but the
patchwork of systems across the country prevents true justice from being done.
A federal system would provide greater resources to struggling systems and
ensure uniform death investigations across the country. Without meaningful
change, the current system that creates conflicts of interest will continue to
thwart the accuracy and integrity of the death investigation process and
fairness in individual cases.

